The conquest of Abyssinia would link together two Italian African territories – (see map) Eritrea and Italian Somaliland – and provide land for Italians to settle.

At the Wal-Wal oasis, 80 kilometres inside the Abyssinian border with Italian Somaliland, Italian and Abyssinian forces clashed in December 1934. A full-scale invasion began in October 1935, when Mussolini’s forces were ready. He believed that the League would not respond, as Britain and France would not strongly object. In fact Mussolini been privately assured by the French Foreign Minister Pierre Laval that he would be given a free hand in Abyssinia, and the British had wanted to reach an agreement in which Mussolini would have control over the territory without formally annexing it. Neither the French nor the British wanted to lose Italy as an ally against Nazi Germany. The Italians had already prevented Hitler from attempting Anschluss (see next unit)  in 1934.  However, the brutality and ferocity of the Italian assault on Abyssinia made it difficult for  Britain and France to continue with this position.

Abyssinia was a member state of the League of Nations, and Emperor, Haile Selassie, appealed to the League to respond to this aggression from another member state.

I, Haile Selassie Emperor of Abyssinia am here today to claim that justice which is due to my people and the assistance promised to it eight months ago when fifty nations asserted that aggression had been committed in violation of international treaties ... What real assistance was given to Ethiopia by the fifty-two nations who had declared the Rome Government guilty of a breach of the Covenant and had undertaken to prevent the triumph of the aggressor? ... I noted with grief, but without surprise that three powers considered their undertakings under the Covenant as absolutely of no value. ... What, then, in practice, is the meaning of Article 16 of the Covenant and of collective security? ... It is collective security: it is the very existence of the League of Nations. It is the value of promises made to small states that their integrity and independence be respected and ensured ... it is the principle of the equality of states. ... In a word, it is international morality that is at stake.

Extract from a speech by Haile Selassie to the League of Nations, June 1936.

The League’s response came on 18 October. Italy’s invasion was condemned and the League decided to employ an escalating programme of sanctions. Britain and France worked for a settlement outside the League in an attempt to avoid a breakdown in relations with Italy. France was hopeful of gaining Italian support for an anti-German alignment that might help to contain Nazi aggression. Britain was faced with possible Japanese aggression in the Far East and also had to consider the dangers of having Italy as an enemy, when Italy occupied an important strategic position in the Mediterranean Sea, a major sea route for Britain through to its imperial possessions.

In December, the British Foreign Minister Samuel Hoare and the French Foreign Minister Laval renewed a plan that had already been considered by the League in September. The plan, called the Hoare–Laval Pact, was to allow Italian control of around two-thirds of Abyssinia. Mussolini could have accepted this idea, but it was never to be put on the table, as it was leaked to the French press. The pro-League public was outraged and Hoare was forced to resign. The plan was shelved.

Public opinion of member states, and in the US was outraged by the use of aerial bombardment and poison gas in Abyssinia and supported a strong response from the League.  However, the League’s subsequent sanctions were so diluted that they had little impact on the Italian war effort.

• No embargo was put on oil exports to Italy
• Britain refused to close the Suez Canal to Italian shipping

Mussolini was then able to escalate his campaign until May 1936, when the Italians were in control of Abyssinia.

The immediate effects of victory were exhilarating. Mussolini had succeeded where the old Italy had failed. He had defeated not only the Abyssinians but the League of Nations. He abandoned his former cautious approach to foreign affairs and looked for new worlds to conquer.

P.M.H. Bell, Origins of the Second World War (Longman, 1986), pp.63–64.

For the League, the Abyssinian Crisis was a disaster.

• A permanent member had again successfully ignored the League and had been victorious through violence and war.
• The League had proved itself ineffective in using ‘collective security’ to maintain peace.
• The crisis had revealed (as had already been seen in Manchuria) that the leading League powers were not prepared to stand up to other major members if their interests were not directly threatened. It was too dangerous to invoke a conflict with a power that while upholding the idea of collective security – might adversely affect their own power and international position.
• Severely damaged relations between Italy, France and Britain. Italy, now isolated from its former allies, moved closer to Nazi Germany. The alliance between the British, French, and Italians as key permanent members of the Council had collapsed.
• Italy withdrew from the League.
• The League’s ultimate weakness was exposed for Hitler to exploit, which he readily did with the militarization of the Rhineland in March 1936.

Many historians have viewed the Abyssinian Crisis as the ‘final nail in the coffin’ for the League of Nations. The League of Nations could no longer exert any authority. Collective security had failed.